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Abstract
Choosing a project for which bene￿ts accrue to all involved agents but brings
major costs or additional bene￿ts to only one agent is often problematic. Siting
a nationwide nuclear waste disposal or hosting a major sporting event are ex-
amples of such a problem: costs or bene￿ts are tied to the identity of the host of
the project. Our goals are twofold: to choose the e￿cient site (the host with the
lowest cost or the highest localized surplus) and to share the cost, or surplus, in
a predetermined way so as to achieve redistributive goals. We propose a simple
mechanism to implement both objectives. The unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is e￿cient, budget-
balanced and immune to coalitional deviations.
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The search for hazardous waste land￿lls and nuclear waste repositories in the United
States and in many other countries has proven to be a di￿cult task. Even when o￿ered
monetary compensation, very few communities have accepted to host such facilities.
Since the mid-70’s only one small radioactive waste disposal facility and a single
hazardous waste land￿ll (￿ttingly located in Last Chance, Colorado) have been sited
in the United States (see Gerrard, 1994). Consequently, the U.S. nuclear industry
still faces a major problem. Several other similar programs face social rejection from
local populations: noxious facilities, prisons, airports, etc. These public goods are
socially necessary but come with local externalities (noise, pollution, noxious odors,
etc) or bear a negative connotation. Di￿erent factors can generate such rejection:
the loss in the economic value of property, loss in the perceived quality of life or the
fear of health hazards. In economic terms, these public goods have a private-bad
aspect which creates a siting problem (the so-called "NIMBY" problem, for "Not In
My Backyard"): all communities will bene￿t from the good, but only one (the host)
will bear the cost.
Choosing a host for a project which generates desirable local externalities, such
as a major international research project (like the International Thermonuclear Ex-
perimental Reactor, ITER) or a major sporting event (the Olympic Games), is not
an easier task to accomplish. Here, bene￿ts accrue to all (as in the "local bad" case)
but the host obtains an additional localized surplus. Consequently, all communities
compete to be the host. The selection is then a long and tedious process where each
participant tries to prove that it is the best candidate. For more readability, we
consider the case of a project which generates negative externalities throughout the
body of the paper. However, a locally desirable project generating positive external-
ities could easily be formalized in this framework (see appendix).
Conventional siting approaches of a "local bad" are currently characterized by a
decide-announce-defend structure (see Easterling, 1992, Minehart and Neeman, 2002,
the Environmental Protection Agency, 2002, and Marchetti, 2005, for comprehensive
reviews). First, (secret) investigations are carried out to evaluate the technical suit-
ability of a location. Then, the prospective host community is confronted with the
siting proposal and promises of compensation. Alternatively, the economic approach
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cost it would incur should it be the host, the host is then chosen. Note that this
cost could be the composite of a technical cost (e.g. the physical construction cost,
speci￿c to the community) and a disutility (e.g. the aggregation of the preferences of
the inhabitants over the externalities of the project).
The ￿rst aspect of the problem is the choice of a host. The overall cost of the
project is tied to the identity of the host. Thus, e￿ciency asks that the host be
the community which incurs the lowest disutility. Then, this cost should be shared
between communities to insure the necessary agreement of all involved agents, which
is the second aspect of the problem. It may happen that even when the e￿cient host is
identi￿ed, there still could exist strong opposition (from the host or other participants)
preventing the e￿cient outcome from occurring: we thus face a redistribution issue.
As pointed out in Easterling (1992) and Frey et al. (1996), the structure of the
compensation itself could result in the rejection of the project. Numerous papers in
￿elds other than economics also emphasize this point (see, for a social-psychological
approach, Pol et al., 2006, or Kuhn and Ballard, 1998, for a geographic viewpoint):
redistribution is intrinsically part of the selection problem.
For example, the long and di￿cult process of selecting a location for the interna-
tional project ITER was solved by an agreement on the redistribution scheme (France,
Japan, Canada and Spain both proposed to host the project): "the decision to site
ITER at Cadarache [France] was ￿nally taken on June 28 [2005]. A compromise
formula between Europe and Japan over cost-sharing, in particular the respective
contributions of industrial hardware and personnel to the project, made this possi-
ble."1.
In fact, the planner may wish to select a speci￿c sharing outcome while choosing
a site, which could take into account the voluntary participation of involved commu-
nities (no community should pay more than the bene￿ts it derives from the project),
their budget constraints, their respective involvement in the project or any other rel-
1India’s National Magazine, 14/01/2006. Participating members of the ITER cooperation agreed
on the following division of funding contributions: the six non-host partners will contribute 6/11th of
the total cost while the host (European Union) will put in the rest. As for the industrial contribution,
￿ve countries (China, India, Korea, Russia, and the US) will contribute 1/11th each, Japan 2/11th,
and EU 4/11th.
3evant characteristic. Taking into account redistribution issues could ease the siting
process.
We propose a simple mechanism for choosing the host of a project which imple-
ments any reasonable redistribution scheme. The informational context we use is one
where the communities know each other’s characteristics (bene￿ts and costs), but the
planner does not. This assumption, while restrictive, reasonably approximates envi-
ronments where the agents involved in the project have much more information than
the planner (e.g. communities in a region are better informed about their mutual
characteristics than the federal state). We show that the unique subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of our mechanism coincides with truth-telling (the host reveals its
true disutility). Moreover, the host chosen in equilibrium is the e￿cient one (whenever
carrying out the project turns out to be e￿cient) and the outcome is budget-balanced.
Additionally, our approach incorporates a component which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been considered in the literature: the bene￿ts that communities
obtain if the project is carried out. We believe that adding this bene￿t component
enhances the model in at least two ways. First, it determines explicitly whether
the project should be carried out (if the sum of the bene￿ts exceeds the total cost).
Additionally, it allows the planner to place an upper bound on the cost share that each
community will be asked to pay (so as to ensure voluntary participation), if stability
is considered to be an issue. In fact, our mechanism enforces voluntary participation
by allowing a net loser to opt out of the procedure.
The mechanism we propose proceeds in two stages: in the ￿rst stage, each com-
munity announces the lowest cost which would be incurred if the project were sited
in a community other than itself (the community announcing the lowest cost will be
referred to as the "optimist") and, in the second stage, each community announces
its own cost of hosting the project. The host is selected among those communities
which announce the lowest cost in the second stage. Compensation transfers are then
implemented. The key point is that each community pays a cost share which is inde-
pendent of its own announcement: the optimist’s share depends on the announcement
of the host, while the host and the other communities pay according to the optimist’s
announcement. The host is compensated by the amount announced by the optimist
and balanced the budget if its announcement is di￿erent than the optimist’s one.
Thus, it is a weakly dominant strategy for all communities to announce the true cost
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cost on the second stage. At the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the host
is the community with the lowest cost and the total cost to be shared is the actual
one. This unique equilibrium is immune to coalitional deviations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review more precisely
the economic literature on the siting issue. Section 3 exposes the model, while Section
4 presents the mechanism and the theorems. In Section 5 we discuss three issues
related to our mechanism: we present a procedure for revealing the pro￿le of bene￿ts
and the pro￿le of costs (a composite of our mechanism and the one of Jackson and
Moulin, 1992), we discuss the case where the pro￿les of bene￿ts and costs condition
cost-shares of communities and we present the two agents case.
2 Related Literature
Several methods are known for selecting an outcome out of a set of alternatives. The
trade-o￿ between e￿ciency, budget balance and incentive-compatibility is central in
all these methods. One class of mechanisms selecting e￿ciently is that of Vickrey-
Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. Announcing one’s real disutility is a dominant
strategy (thus the e￿cient outcome is chosen) but the mechanism fails to balance the
budget: it generates a surplus which cannot be redistributed between the agents in
order to preserve the strategic properties of the method (see Moulin, 2007, Section 4,
for a VCG treatment of the NIMBY problem).
To the best of our knowledge, Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986) are the ￿rst
to explicitly consider the siting of a public good generating a local nuisance. They
propose a sealed-bid auction where the host community receives its own bid as com-
pensation and other communities pay their bid divided by the number of communities
minus one. They show that the outcome is e￿cient (but not budget-balanced) if com-
munities employ maximin strategies.
O’Sullivan (1993) investigates Bayesian-Nash equilibrium behavior under a sealed-
bid auction where the city submitting the lowest bid hosts the project and receives
the highest bid as compensation (thus failing to balance the budget). In the same
vein, Minehart and Neeman (2002) propose a method adapted from a second-price
auction to site a project. The project is sited in the community with the lowest cost
5or, if not (compensation induces misrepresentation of costs), the authors argue that
the e￿ciency loss is small. The procedure is self-￿nanced but the host obtains a
surplus because it is compensated with the second lowest bid, as in a second price
auction.
The fact that redistribution is an issue when selecting a host for a project is
pointed by numerous studies, often from a normative viewpoint. Marchetti and Serra
(2004) consider the siting problem as a cooperative game. They study the standard
solutions of cooperative game theory (the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core)
with an asymmetry in the value function: the value of the cooperation changes when
the host changes. Additionally, they design an experiment and test which solution is
the most appealing for participants. Also, Saka￿ (2006) axiomatizes the properties of
the proportional procedure used by Minehart and Neeman (2002).
In a companion paper, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2007) de￿ne desirable prop-
erties which a cost-sharing method should meet, and characterize the Equal Respon-
sibility Method. This method shares the cost in proportion of the bene￿ts each
community obtains from the project. It meets the important Voluntary Participa-
tion property (no community should pay more than the bene￿ts it obtains from the
project) and two other properties: one aiming to remove the natural asymmetry of
the problem and another which imposes solidarity when population movements oc-
cur between communities (a point raised by Sullivan, 1990, and Baumol and Oates,
1998).
Regarding implementation, no selection mechanism allows to freely choose the
redistribution scheme once the host has been selected, to the best of our knowledge.
The mechanism we propose here allows for the implementation of any reasonable
redistribution scheme and shares several features of that developed in Jackson and
Moulin (1992), which explicitly treats this redistribution issue while constructing
a public good. However, the problem they consider is quite di￿erent: it is not a
selection problem as they consider only one possible project. The cost of construction
is known and agents’ characteristics are the bene￿ts each community obtains if the
public project is built. At every undominated Nash equilibrium of their mechanism,
the public project is undertaken when the sum of bene￿ts outweighs its cost. A large
range of cost-sharing methods can be implemented by the planner.
Closer to our concern, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) develop a multi-
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of bids (one bid by potential site), where each bid is interpreted as the amount it
is willing to pay if the project is sited in this speci￿c community. The sum of bids
submitted by any one community must sum up to zero. In addition each agent an-
nounces a project (interpreted as its "preferred" site). The project with the highest
aggregate bid is chosen as the winner and each community pays its bid for this site.
In case of a tie, the winning project is randomly chosen among those with highest
aggregate bid which are announced by at least one agent2. They show that a Nash
equilibrium always exists and that in any Nash equilibrium an e￿cient project is car-
ried out. Their procedure is budget-balanced at every Nash equilibrium. They also
show that every Nash equilibrium of the game is a strong Nash equilibrium (immune
to coalitional deviation). The main drawback of their approach is that the planner
cannot select a speci￿c redistributive outcome, they only guarantee that at each Nash
equilibrium a community obtains at least its expected payo￿ (the payo￿ if the site is
randomly chosen). Therefore, the planner cannot induce the outcome to take into
account voluntary participation, budget constraint or any other relevant characteris-
tic of the participating agents. Our mechanism improves upon theirs as it admits a
unique (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium and, additionally, allows the planner to
implement any reasonable redistribution scheme. This equilibrium is also immune to
coalitional deviations.
3 The Model
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of communities. Each community i = 1;::::n obtains a
bene￿t, bi, if the project is carried out and endures a disutility, di, if it is chosen to
host the project3. We take the view that di encompasses the actual construction cost
of the project plus the disutility of the communities, both of which are community-
2Ehlers (2007) considers a "natural multi-bidding mechanism" where an agent does not announce
it’s preferred project. Here, the planner asks agents to submit bids only and interprets an agent’s
announced projects to be the ones with the maximal bid. He shows that this interpretation puts
severe restrictions on the existence of NE in the natural multi-bidding mechanism. In particular
when one project is unambiguously e￿cient, then no equilibrium exists.
3In the body of the paper, we shall assume di ¸ 0 (the case of a "local bad"). The case di · 0
(for a "local good") is similar and will be detailed in the appendix.
7speci￿c. Let b = (bi)i²N be the pro￿le of bene￿ts and d = (di)i²N be the disutility
pro￿le. The pro￿le of bene￿ts is taken to be common knowledge (see Section 5 for
a procedure to reveal this pro￿le as well). The pro￿le of disutilities is known by all
communities, but not by the planner. Thus, the total payo￿ of a community i if the
project is carried out is given by ui:
ui = bi ¡ I(i = host)di ¡ ti (1)
where ti is the transfers paid by community i and I(i = host) is the indicator function
equal to 1 if i is the host and 0 otherwise. A project is e￿cient if its host h is
such that dh = min(di) and if the sum of bene￿ts outweighs this cost:
P
N bi ¸ dh.
Without loss of generality we rank communities from lowest to highest disutilities:
d1 · d2 · :::: · dn. Thus, a project is e￿cient if dh = d1 and
P
N bi ¸ d1.
We design a mechanism which selects a host community and assigns nonnegative
cost-shares ®i(µ)dh to each community i, where µ is a set of exogenous (and known)
characteristics relevant for sharing the cost (revenue of a community, etc), and where
P
N ®i(µ) = 1. In Section 5, we will discuss the case where bi and di are included in
µ.
4 The Mechanism
The mechanism has two stages, we will focus on its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Stage 1: Each community i announces the lowest disutility that would be paid
if the good is sited in an other community that itself: di = min(di
j) for all i 6= j.
De￿ne d as the min(di). The community i which announce d will be referred to as
the community i¤ (the "optimist"). If there is more than one "optimist" then any
tie-breaking rule could be applied to select one i¤. If
P
N bi ¸ d we proceed to stage
2, otherwise we stop and the project is not carried out.
Stage 2: Given d and i¤, each community other than i¤ announces its own disu-
tility: ±i. De￿ne ±h as the mini6=i¤(±i). The host community ("h") will be (randomly)
selected among those announcing ±h.






th = ¡d + ®h(µ)d + jd ¡ ±hj
If ±h ¸
P
N bi, the host is randomly chosen from the set of ±i for all i 6= i¤. In that
case, the transfers di￿er from the above expression only in that th = ¡d+®h(µ)d (i.e.
agent h no longer pays the di￿erence between d and ±h).
Once the transfers are known, the planner gives the opportunity to each commu-
nity i such that ti > bi to opt out of the mechanism. If no community opts out,
the procedure ends. Otherwise, we repeat the procedure excluding the communities
which have opted out.




ui¤ = bi¤ ¡ ®i¤(µ)±h
ui = bi ¡ ®i(µ)d
uh = bh ¡ ®h(µ)d + (d ¡ dh) ¡ jd ¡ ±hj
Theorem 1. Let n ¸ 3, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the mecha-
nism coincides with truthful revelation, ±h = d = d1, whenever it is e￿cient to carry
out the project. Otherwise the project is not carried out. The outcome is e￿cient,
budget-balanced and achieved without any community opting out as long as tj(µ) · bj
for all j.
Proof. Step 1: ±h = d
² Suppose a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) existed where ±h > d.
If d > dh, then, h could obtain a higher payo￿ by announcing a lower ±h. If
d < dh, then, h could obtain a higher payo￿ by announcing ^ ±h > ±h2, where ±h2
is the second lowest ±. Then, h is no longer the host, it "becomes" an agent
i and obtains a higher payo￿. Thus, ±h > d cannot be part of a SPNE of the
mechanism.
9² Suppose a SPNE existed where ±h < d. Then, h could obtain a higher payo￿
by announcing a higher ±h. Thus, ±h < d cannot be part of a SPNE of the
mechanism.
Step 2: ±h = d = dh
² Suppose a SPNE existed where ±h = d > dh. Then, in ￿rst stage, i¤ could
obtain a lower cost share by announcing a lower d (and, by step 1, its cost ±h).
Thus, ±h = d > dh cannot be part of a SPNE of the mechanism.
² Suppose a SPNE existed where ±h = d < dh. Then, in the second stage, h could
obtain a higher payo￿ by announcing ^ ±h > ±h2 (step 1). Thus, ±h = d < dh
cannot be part of a SPNE of the mechanism.
Step 3: dh = d1
² Suppose a SPNE existed where ±h = d = dh > d1. Then, 1 could obtain a higher
payo￿ by announcing ±1 < ±h and becoming the host. Thus, ±h = d = dh > d1
cannot be part of a SPNE of the mechanism. Hence, because dh ¸ d1 (with our
notation), it must be that dh = d1.
We leave it up to the reader to check that the strategy pro￿le below supports this
SPNE:
Each agent i plays the following strategy:
Stage 1:
² Announce di = minj6=i(dj).
Stage 2:
² If d < d1: Announce ±i =
P
N bi + ².
² if d2 ¸ d ¸ d1: Announce ±i = di.
² If d ¸ d2: Announce ±i = di if di ¸ d, or ±i = 0 if di < d.
10Hence, if a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique and it coincides
with the truth-telling outcome: whenever it is e￿cient to build, the host is an e￿cient
one, and the cost to be shared is the true cost. One important concern regarding the
selection of an e￿cient outcome in Nash equilibrium is its robustness to coalitional
deviations. If a subset of agents can improve their aggregate payo￿ by joint deviations
from the equilibrium, its stability could be compromised. It turns out that the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is also immune to any such
coalitional deviations.
Theorem 2. For n ¸ 3, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the mecha-
nism is also immune to coalitional deviations.
Proof. For more readability, we consider only three agents which will play the role of
i; i¤ and h in equilibrium. The proof easily extendes to n > 3. We denote a variation
of the variable x as ¢x and we consider b, µ and ® as given.
² Step 1: Coalition of i; i¤ and h
The unique SPNE of our mechanism is e￿cient: the host is one of the commu-
nities with the lowest cost, which maximizes the sum of all payo￿s. Thus, this
coalition (the "grand coalition") cannot increase its aggregate payo￿ by a joint
deviation.
² Step 2: Coalition of h and i¤
Consider the joint payo￿:
uh;i¤(±h;d) = (bi¤ + bh) ¡ (®i¤(µ)±h + ®h(µ)d) + (d ¡ dh) ¡ jd ¡ ±hj
A positive variation in ±h (given that h is still the host) decreases the joint
payo￿ by (1 + ®i¤(µ))¢±h > 0. If ±h + ¢±h > ±h2, roles change (h "becomes"
an agent i), then the joint payo￿ decreases by ®i¤(µ)(±h2 ¡ ±h) ¸ 0. A negative
variation in ±h decreases the joint payo￿ by (1 ¡ ®i¤(µ))j¢±hj ¸ 0.
11A negative variation in d decreases the joint payo￿ by (2 ¡ ®h(µ))j¢dj > 0.
A positive variation in d is impossible given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le:
community i announces di = d1 in ￿rst stage and d is chosen as the minimum
value of that set.
Coordinated deviations from d and ±h (given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le, ¢d
could not be positive): if the variations are in opposite directions (positive for
±h and negative for d) the joint payo￿ decreases by the sum of the corresponding
impact previously described. If the variations are both negative the joint payo￿
decreases by j¢dj + j¢d ¡ ¢±hj ¡ (®i¤(µ)j¢±hj + ®h(µ)j¢dj) ¸ 0.
Thus, uh;i¤(±h;d) ¸ uh;i¤(±h + ¢±h;d + ¢d).
² Step 3: Coalition of h and i
Consider the joint payo￿:
uh;i(±h;d) = (bi + bh) ¡ (®i(µ)d + ®h(µ)d) + (d ¡ dh) ¡ jd ¡ ±hj
A positive variation in ±h (given that h is still the host) decreases the joint
payo￿ by ¢±h > 0. If ±h + ¢±h > ±h2, roles changes (h "becomes" an agent i)
and the joint payo￿ does not change. A negative variation in ±h decreases the
joint payo￿ by j¢±hj > 0.
A negative variation in d decreases the payo￿ by (2 ¡ ®i¤(µ))j¢dj > 0 (i "be-
comes" i¤ given the pro￿le of strategies which sustains the equilibrium). A
positive variation is impossible given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le: commu-
nity i¤ announces di¤ = d1 in ￿rst stage and, by de￿nition, d is randomly chosen
among the minimum values of that set.
Coordinated deviations from d and ±h (given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le,
¢d could not be positive): if the variations are in opposite directions (positive
for ±h and negative for d) the joint payo￿ decreases by the sum of the corre-
sponding impact previously described. If the variations are both negative (i
"becomes" i¤ given the pro￿le of strategies which sustains the equilibrium) the
payo￿ decreases by j¢dj + j¢d ¡ ¢±hj ¡ (®i¤(µ)j¢±hj + ®h(µ)j¢dj) ¸ 0.
Thus, uh;i(±h;d) ¸ uh;i(±h + ¢±h;d + ¢d).
12² Step 4: Coalition of i and i¤
Consider the aggregate payo￿:
ui;i¤(±h;d) = (bi¤ + bh) ¡ (®i¤(µ)±h + ®i(µ)d)
Given the strategy pro￿le which sustains the equilibrium, a negative variation
in d decreases the joint payo￿ by (
P
N bi+²)¡d1 ¸ 0 if i follows its equilibrium
strategy and h is randomly chosen as the host, by ((
P
N bi + ²) ¡ d1) + (di ¡
d) + jd ¡ ±hj > 0 if i follows its equilibrium strategy and i is randomly chosen
as the host, or by (di ¡d)+jd¡±ij > 0 if i becomes the host without following
its equilibrium strategy. A positive variation in d decreases the joint payo￿ by
®i¤(µ)¢d ¸ 0.
A negative variation of ±i such that ±i +¢±i < ±h implies that agent i becomes
the host and the joint payo￿ decreases by (di¡d)+(1¡®i¤(µ))j¢±hj > 0 (d · di
given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le).
Coordinated deviations from d and ±i such that ±i + ¢±i < ±h: the variations
cannot be in opposite directions because, given the equilibrium strategy pro￿le,
agent i cannot increases ±h and if it announces ±i + ¢±i < ±h it becomes the
host (and h becomes i) so d cannot increase anymore. If the variations are
both negative (i "becomes" h given the pro￿le of strategies which sustains the
equilibrium) the joint payo￿ decreases by j¢dj + j¢d ¡ ¢±ij ¡ (®i¤(µ)j¢±hj +
®i(µ)j¢dj) ¸ 0.
Thus, ui;i¤(±h;d) ¸ ui;i¤(±h + ¢±h;d + ¢d)
5 Discussion
If the pro￿le b is unknown and the planner wishes to include it in the variables
conditioning cost shares, then a combination of our mechanism and the one of Jackson
and Moulin (1992, referred to as J&M from now on) could be used to obtain it. We
consider, as in J&M, that a cost-sharing method is a mapping ® associating to every
13pro￿le b a vector of non-negative cost shares ®i(µ;b). Monotonicity properties are
required (see J&M, Section 3, for more details): ￿rst, ®i(µ;b) as to be non-decreasing
in bi and non-increasing in b¡i. Additionally, when a unit of agent i’s bene￿t is shifted
to agent j, then agent i’s share could not reduce by more than the amount transferred.
The procedure we propose embeds our mechanism to the one in J&M. In the ￿rst
stage of the procedure, each community announces an estimate of the joint bene￿t
from the project: vi , where vi 2 R+. We denote the community i announcing the
highest joint bene￿t, v, as the agent ^ i. In the second stage, each community reports
their own valuations for the project: ¯i, where ¯i 2 R+. Then, we compare the sum
of these valuations, ¯N, to v. If ¯N > v, we implement our mechanism with ¯N
instead of
P
N bi and the restriction that ^ i could not be the same agent as i¤. The
compensation payments, ti, take the same form as in J&M where each agent pays a
cost share independent of its own valuation, and agent ^ i pays the balance. If ¯N < v,
we implement our mechanism and di￿erent payments are made: if d < ¯N the project
is not build and no one pays anything. If d ¸ ¯N, the project is not build either but
transfer payments are made from ^ i to the other agents so as to dissuade agent ^ i to
overestimate v but not high enough for agents i to underestimate ¯i (see J&M for
details on these transfers). If ¯N = v, agent ^ i choose either one of the two above
outcomes.
At every undominated Nash equilibrium, this procedure selects an e￿cient host
(whenever it is e￿cient to carry out the project), the highest ￿rst stage bid is equal to
the joint surplus (v =
P
N bi), and the second stage bids reveal the agents’ true ben-
e￿ts (¯i = bi). Thus, the cost-shares ®i(µ;b) are implemented. A simple modi￿cation
of the above mechanism allows an implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium (as
described by J&M). However it involves (n+1) stages and agent ^ i will be required to
announce the entire pro￿le of bene￿ts, not just his own bene￿t and the joint bene￿t.
As in J&M, we opted for presenting the shorter mechanism above for more readability.
If the planner wishes to include the pro￿le d in ®, a monotonicity property has to
be introduced to maintain the strategic properties of the procedure: it must be that
®i(:) is non-decreasing in di. If the planner wishes the outcome of the mechanism to
be immune to coalitional deviations, then ®i(:) should not depend on d¡i. If it is not
the case, then a coalition of agents (which does not include the host community) may
increases its aggregate payo￿ by announcing di￿erent valuations.
14In a companion paper, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2007) de￿ne explicitly a
property on the relation between ®i(:) and d. This property aims to remove the
natural asymmetry of the siting problem: the cost incurred by the host, dh, determines
the total cost to be shared among the set of communities. A standard requirement, in
more classical cost-sharing literature, is that if the total cost increases, no one should
pay less than before; hence, in our context, if the disutility of the host is higher, no
community should have a lower cost share. Thus, we extend this responsibility to
all communities and require that all be subject to that cost monotonicity. We call
this property extended cost monotonicity. It happens that this property implies (in
combination with budget balance) a total insensibility of ®i to the pro￿le d.
The two agents case: to be done...
We developed a simple mechanism for selecting a host for a project which gener-
ates local externalities (i.e. nuclear waste repository, prison, the Olympic Games...).
This mechanism permits to choose the e￿cient site and to implement multiple re-
distribution schemes. We believe the redistribution to be an integral part of the
selection problem: even if the e￿cient host is chosen, there still could exist strong
opposition that prevents the e￿cient outcome from occurring. The planner may want
to overcome this opposition by adapting the redistribution scheme to each speci￿c
issues (budget constraint of communities, voluntary participation...). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ￿rst mechanism which allows to implement both of these
objectives. It is simple and at its unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the out-
come coincides with truth-telling, is e￿cient, budget-balanced and immune to any
coalitional deviations.
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17A The case of a locally desirable project
A project is to be sited in a community. Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of communities.
Each community i = 1;::::n obtains a bene￿t, bi, if the project is carried out and a
surplus, si, if it is the host of the project. We consider that the cost of construction
of the project is subtracted to the surplus of all communities (both are speci￿c to the
community i) . Let b = (bi)i²N be the pro￿le of bene￿ts and s = (si)i²N be the pro￿le
of surpluses. The total payo￿ of a community i if the project is carried out is given
by ui:
ui = bi + I(i = host)si + ti (2)
Where ti is the transfers received by community i and I(i = host) is the indicator
function equal to 1 if i is the host and 0 otherwise. A project is e￿cient if its host h is
such that sh = max(si). Without loss of generality we rank communities from highest
to lowest surpluses: s1 ¸ s2 ¸ :::: ¸ sn. Thus, a project is e￿cient if sh = s1 ¸ 0.
Stage 1: Each community i announces the highest surplus that would be shared
if the good is sited in an other community that itself: si = max(si
j) for all i 6= j.
De￿ne s as the max(si). The community i which announce s will be referred as
the community i¤ (the "optimist"). If there is more than one "optimist" then any
tie-breaking rule could be applied to select one i¤. If s ¸ 0 we proceed to stage 2,
otherwise we stop and the project is not carried out.
Stage 2: Given s and i¤, each community announces its own surplus: ±i for all i.
De￿ne ±h as the maxi6=i¤(±i). The community which announce ±h will be referred as
the host (h).






th = ¡s + ®h(µ)s + js ¡ ±hj




ui¤ = bi¤ + ®i¤(µ)±h
ui = bi + ®i(µ)s
uh = bh + ®h(µ)s + (sh ¡ s) ¡ js ¡ ±hj
18The theorems below follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2:
Theorem 3. Let n ¸ 3, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the mech-
anism coincides with the truthful revelation outcome, ±h = s = s1, whenever it is
e￿cient to carry out the project. Otherwise the project is not carried out. Thus, the
outcome is e￿cient and budget-balanced.
Theorem 4. The unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome of the mecha-
nism is immune to any coalitional deviations.
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